Michigan Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 3

1961

Real Property - Easements by Implication - Creation of Easements
By Implied Reservations in Michigan
Ralph W. Aigler
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph W. Aigler, Real Property - Easements by Implication - Creation of Easements By Implied
Reservations in Michigan, 59 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

432

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

COMMENTS
REAL PROPERTY - EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION - CREATION OF
EASEMENTS BY IMPLIED RESERVATIONS IN MICHIGAN- In 1910 K
occupied an "old" house located on the westerly portion of her lot
fronting on H Street. She built a "new" house on the east side of
the lot, moved into it, and rented the "old" house to tenants. As
a means of access to the west side and rear of the "new" house, she
built and used a sidewalk which led from H Street between the
two houses and which was one foot from the west side of the "new"
house. This walk "was the only outdoor means of access to the new
house's coal chute."1
In 1912 K conveyed the "old" house portion of the lot to X
from whom defendants traced title. The deed to X described the
portion conveyed as thirty-six feet in width. That made the conveyance include the sidewalk and even a portion of the eaves of
the "new" house which was retained by K. Despite this deed, the
sidewalk was used by K (together with X and successors) for many
years.
In 1944 K conveyed the easterly portion-the "new" house part
-to a grantee through whom plaintiff claims. The occupants of
both portions continued to use the walk until 1955 when defendants razed the "old" house and built a structure that prevented any
further use of the walk. In the resulting litigation the question
was whether plaintiff had a right to use the walk as against defendants. The possibility of an easement by prescription apparently was quickly eliminated, presumably because the user after
1912 was not adverse. The case then turned upon whether K, in
1912, had impliedly reserved an easement over the premises now
belonging to defendants, an easement represented by the walk.
The trial court upheld the position of the defendants-no such
easement. On appeal, held, reversed, Harrison v. Heald, 360 Mich.
203, 103 N.W.2d 348 (1960).
A lawyer consulted by plaintiff would probably have been impressed by the fact that K had so adapted and used the two parts of
the lot as to subject the "old" house part to a use for the benefit of
the "new" house part. He would quickly dismiss the idea that
Michigan legislation would solve the problem. Turning to the
case law, he may have noted Smith v. Dresselhouse2 in which
Ostrander, J., said:
Harrison v. Heald, 360 Mich. 203, 204, 103
2152 Mich. 451,454, 116 N.W. 387 (1908).

1

N.W. 2d 358

(1960).
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"It is a general rule of the law of easements that where
the owner of two tenements sells one of them, the purchaser
takes the portion sold with all the benefits and burdens which
appear at the time of the sale to belong to it as between it and
the property which the vendor retains."
Our attorney might or might not have observed that in
Covell v. Bright,8 decided not long after the Dresselhouse case,
the court said: "To entitle the complainant to a decree the burden
was upon him to establish that the servitude was apparent, continuous, and strictly necessary to the enjoyment of his lands."
The easement claimed in the Covell case was by implied reservation, while the one in question in Dresselhouse ·was by implied
grant. Perhaps plaintiff's lawyer might have noticed this. But he
may also have found Kamm v. Bygrav& and Rannels v. Marx 5 in
which the court, quoting from a Connecticut case, 6 said that when
a grantor conveys part of his land,
"[T]he law implies that with the grant of the one an
easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in
the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses
and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in
which it appeared and was used when the grant was made."
0£ course, the lawyer should notice that the doctrine enunciated by the court in the Kamm and Rannels cases, as well as in the
Connecticut case, was dictum so far as implied reservations are concerned. This same dictum may be found in Dresselhouse, but rejected in Covell. He might, however, find some comfort in the
fact that the opinion in the Kamm case was written by Mr. Justice
Black who presumably would be sitting in his case if it reached the
highest court.
Now let us see what a lavvyer consulted by defendants might
be expected to have found in the Michigan case law.
Presumably he early would have noticed Brown v. Fuller.1 In
that case the court had to rule on a claim of an easement of drainage claimed to have been created by implied reservation. The
Dresselhouse case apparently had been relied upon by the trial
court. The reviewing court, after pointing out that the Dressela 157 Mich. 419, 423, 122 N.W. 101 (1909).
~ 356 Mich. 189, 96 N .W.2d 770 (1959).
5 357 Mich. 453, 98 N.W.2d 583 (1959).
6 Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637, 643, 46 A.2d 898, 901 (1946).
7 165 Mich. 162, 130 N.W. 621 (19ll).
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house case involved a claim of implied grant, denied the claim of
the drainage easement. Judge Ostrander who had authored the
dictum in Dresselhouse was one of the prevailing judges in Brown
v. Fuller. It was pointed out that an early English case, Pyer v.
Carter,8 had indicated a view that an easement could arise by implied reservation as easily as one by implied grant, but that the
Pyer doctrine had "frequently been severely criticized, and was
finally distinctly overruled in England" by Wheeldon v. Burrows.9
Two members of the court dissented, but not on the ground that
the Dresselhouse dictum was sound. On the contrary, their view
was that the facts in Brown v. Fuller presented an instance of "strict
necessity," and hence was within an exception recognized even by
the English court.
The English law as settled by Wheeldon may be briefly summarized as follows. When the owner of Blackacre conveys a part
of it and the deed is general in its terms, the owner cannot afterward take the position as against his grantee, or the grantee's successors, that he did not convey the described land absolutely nor
that the land is subject to an easement which at the conveyance
arose in his favor. As the court expressed it, a grantor will not be
allowed to "derogate" from his grant. Two possible exceptions to
this general rule were recognized: (1) if the claimed easement is
"strictly necessary" for the use and enjoyment of the retained land,
and (2) if the claimed reserved interest is connected with an easement acquired by the grantee by implication in such a way that
they are "reciprocal."10
Decisions in American courts are far from harmonious. Although Wheeldon v. Burrows had had quite a lot of support in
addition to Brown v. Fuller, not a few courts have applied the
doctrine of Pyer v. Carter that no distinction is to be drawn between implied grant and reservation. This latter view was expressed by way of dictum in Smith v. Dresselhouse. In the Restatement of Property, section 476, a middle ground is taken. The fact
that the claim is of an implied reservation rather than of a grant is
81 H. & N. 916, 156 Eng. Rep. 1472 (Ex. 1857).
12 Ch. D. 31 (1878). The court was of the opinion that Pyer v. Carter may have
been rightly decided but not on the ground stated, namely that implied reservations are
on the same footing as implied grants. It was thought that the Pyer case came within one
of the exceptions to the broad doctrine that a grantor should not be allowed to derogate
from his grant, which he attempts to do when he claims to have reserved an easement by
implication.
10 The court thought that Pyer v. Carter may have presented such a situation.
9
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a "factor" to be taken into account; but it was found impossible to
state how much weight should attach to that element.11
The decision in Brown v. Fuller thus put Michigan clearly in
accord with the English law announced in Wheeldon. 12 Having
reached this point in his study of the Michigan decisions, our
hypothetical Ia-wyer for the defendants would want to see whether
(a) later Michigan decisions had weakened the force of Brown v.
Fuller or (b) Michigan law as thus indicated was wholly out of line
with the law elsewhere. He would find among the Michigan decisions two later cases in which the Michigan court had squarely
faced the question of implied reservations.
In Bubser v. Ranguette,13 in 1934, the doctrine of "strict necessity" for an easement by implied reservation was applied. The case
involved a portion of a building that encroached upon the land
first conveyed. Bushnell, J ., said:
"Having required strict necessity in cases involving stairways, drains, ways and sewers, we prefer to make no exception
to that rule in encroachment cases even though, in such cases,
the servitude be plainly apparent. To make such an exception,
would leave for further litigation the exact amount of encroachment necessary to make the user apparent. Nor should
the law favor unrecorded servitudes."
And as late as 1948, the court in Von Meding v. Strahl,1 4 speaking through Butzel, J., said that "where an owner who has used a
roadway or pathway over one part of his land for the benefit of
another part conveys the part over which the road passes, an easement for the benefit of his remaining land can only arise where
there are apt words of reservation in the conveyance ... an implied
easement cannot rest upon convenience."
The defendant's lawyer could and should notice Burling v.
Leiter15 which involved a claimed easement by implied grant, not
reservation, because in his dissenting opinion in that case, Sharpe,
]., repeated the discredited dictum of Smith v. Dresselhouse. The
11 REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476, comment a (1944). See generally Comment, 57
MrCH. L. REv. 724 (1959).
12 Jn the prevailing opinion in Brown v. Fuller, supra note 7, the following language
is found at pp. 167-68: "While it is apparent from the record that it will be somewhat
expensive to dispose of the sewage from complainant's building otherwise than over
defendant's land, it by no means appears that it is impossible to do so."
13 269 Mich. 388, 395, 257 N.W. 845 (1934).
14 319 Mich. 598, 605, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948).
15 272 Mich. 448, 262 N.W. 388 (1935).
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quotation by Mr. Justice Sharpe was not in itself particularly significant. It became so because one member of the present court picked
it up in his opinion in Kamm v. Bygrave, referred to above, and one
of the cases relied upon in deciding the Harrison case, the subject
of this discussion. The Kamm case alone was one of implied grant.
In a footnote appended to the opinion the following appears: "Mr.
Justice Nelson Sharpe dissenting in Burling v. Leiter ... quoted
and relied on the rule of Smith [v. Dresselhouse], yet the majority
at the time apparently overlooked it in a case which, on the facts,
seemingly called for definite approval or repudiation thereof."16
Could it be that the majority in the Burling case paid so little
attention to the quotation by Mr. Justice Sharpe because (a) the
quotation was a mere dictum both in the Smith and Burling cases,
(b) it was taken from an English case that had later been repudiated
by the English court, and (c) it had been decisively repudiated by
the Michigan court in the Covell and Brown cases nearly fifty
years ago? Perhaps one or all of those reasons, rather than oversight,
explained the court's disregard of the quotation. If the court in
Kamm overlooked the difference between dictum and decision
and also the difference between implied grant and implied reservation, at least it is not the only court which has ever done so.
This review of the law of easements by implication generally
and in Michigan particularly indicates that the defendant's attorney might have been warranted in believing with some confidence
in his client's position and that the trial judge was on safe ground
in his judgment. But the reviewing court disappointed him when
it found its guide not in the prior decisions of the court, but in a
succession of dicta. Perhaps one must conclude that when a dictum,
despite its repudiation, is nevertheless repeated often enough, it
acquires more significance as a guide in deciding cases than a line
of actual decisions!
Reasonable minds may differ over what the law regarding
easements by implied reservation ought to be-opinions of courts
have differed. If the court in the case under discussion had frankly
pointed out that the rule of such cases as Wheeldon v. Burrows and
Brown v. Fuller and succeeding cases ought, in their judgment,
to be discarded, one might or might not agree. But the court decided the Harrison case, so far as one can tell from the opinion,
without the slightest recognition of the fact that they were in effect
10

Kamm v. Bygrave, supra note 4, at 195.
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repudiating a considerable line of decisions. Such an important
case as Brown v. Fuller is not even mentioned.
Now what is the law of Michigan in this field? How are Ia-ivyers
to advise their clients, and how are trial judges to rule in the understandable hope that they will not be reversed?
In another case, sometime in the future, the court may do what
the English court did in dealing with Pyer v. Carter-approve the
actual decision but not the ground upon which the court relied.
If it is the law that an implied reservation will be permitted only
when the easement is "strictly necessary," and this had been the
law of Michigan, it might later be said that in the Harrison case
there was a strict necessity and that the decision should have been
put on that ground. "Strict necessity" is not an element the presence or absence of which can always be agreed upon unanimously.
In Brown v. Fuller the facts were such that two members of the
court thought the existence' of the claimed easement should be
supported. Whether the element was present in the Harrison case
is a question on which reasonable opinions might differ. If the
court had reached its conclusion on that ground, this comment
would never have been written.17
Ralph W. Aigler*
17 Games played without pre-determined rules are unthinkable. So with the more
important affairs of life. The more this writer has dealt with law, the more definite is
his opinion that in a surprisingly large area the chief merit in the law is not so much its
content as its certainty. With outstanding exceptions, most people, it is believed, really
want to conduct their affairs in accordance with the rule (the law). They often consult
lawyers as to what those rules are, and in giving advice the lawyer is largely governed
by what he figures the decision would be in a properly presented litigation. He rightly
proceeds on the assumption that a court in the potential litigation would decide according
to the law. While it is not maintained that the law, whether by statute or decision,
should never be changed, it is submitted that perhaps too often courts in deciding a case
lose sight of the fact that they are setting a guide for the people, for lawyers, and for trial
judges, to say nothing of law teachers! With the pressures what they are upon many
reviewing courts, a special burden is placed upon counsel. No doubt not a few decisions
that stand out as aberrations are accounted for by slipshod preparation and presentations.
The writer has not examined the record in our principal case so as to be in position to
weigh this factor.
• Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of
Arizona.-Ed.

